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Abstract 
This paper uses a large matched employer-employee dataset to assess the outcomes of 
workplace partnership for British firms and workers. Our findings suggest that HR practices 
associated with direct (non-union based) partnership working such as employee voice 
mechanisms - defined as direct task-based participation, and improved upwards and 
downwards communication between management and employees – can deliver mutual gains 
for both employees and employers. However, some practices associated with partnership 
such as high levels of job flexibility agreements and team briefing procedures are found to be 
negatively associated with work-related attitudes and/or organizational performance.  
 
Keywords: partnership, mutual gains, WERS2011, high performance work systems, HR 
practices 
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1. Introduction  
Issues of labour management cooperation are a recurrent theme in industrial relations 
research, and the most recent wave of interest in many English-speaking Anglo Saxon nations 
has been the issue of labour management partnership at the enterprise level (Johnstone and 
Wilkinson, 2016; 2017). Though notoriously difficult to define, a central idea has been the 
promotion of cooperative relations between unions and management (Bacon and Samuel, 
2009; Bacon and Storey, 2000; Brown, 2000). However, a broader definition views 
workplace partnership as a particular bundle of supporting HRM policies, practices and 
processes, and suggests the possibility of partnership style arrangements in both unionised 
and non-unionised environments (Johnstone et al, 2009; 2014; van Wanrooy et.al, 2013).  
This more inclusive definition has clear parallels with related concepts such as high 
performance work systems (e.g. Appelbaum et al, 2000; Kochan and Osterman, 2004). A key 
controversy, however, is the extent to which workplace partnership can deliver mutual gains 
(Kochan and Osterman, 1994), and various studies have empirically assessed the risks and 
benefits for unions, employees and employers (Butler et al., 2011; Dobbins and Gunnigle, 
2009; Geary and Trif, 2011; Guest and Peccei, 2001; Johnstone, 2010; Johnstone, 2010a; 
2010b, 2011; Whyman and Petrescu, 2014). 
Three main views are apparent in the literature. First, the so-called ‘mutual gains’ 
thesis (Cooke 1990; Kochan and Osterman, 1994), suggests that all workplace stakeholders 
(i.e. organisations, employees and trade unions) can potentially benefit and share the growing 
‘pie’. Second, the ‘pessimistic thesis’ suggests that the outcomes for unions, workers and 
their representatives are likely to be negative (Kelly, 2004; Upchurch et al, 2008). 
Somewhere in between is the ‘constrained mutuality’ thesis (Guest and Peccei, 2001), which 
proposes that while employees may derive some gains, the balance of advantage is likely to 
be skewed towards the employer. A similar point is made by Geary and Trif (2011) who 
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suggest that the three perspectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and that elements 
of each perspective can be observed in empirical studies of partnership. The inconclusive 
findings of various qualitative case studies also stress the need for a more contingent view 
(e.g. Glover et al., 2014; Geary and Trif, 2011; Kochan et al., 2008; Upchurch et al, 2008).  
Yet while partnership case studies can provide rich insights into the contextual factors 
associated with ‘successful’ or ‘unsuccessful’ examples of labour management cooperation 
(e.g. Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2017), it is difficult to generalise about the diffusion or 
effectiveness of partnership at delivering ‘mutual gains’. Such questions lead themselves 
towards quantitative analysis, though to date there have been relatively few such studies (e.g. 
Valizade et al., 2016; Whyman and Petrescu, 2014). Many workplace case studies also rely 
most heavily upon accounts from union representatives and/or management respondents, 
while worker perspectives have been relatively underemphasised (Valizade et al., 2016; 
Glover et al., 2014; Johnstone et.al, 2009). This is surprising given that mutuality ostensibly 
lies at the heart of partnership style employment relationships (Boxall, 2013; Guest et al., 
2008) and employees’ experience are reliable measures for determining effectiveness of 
workplace partnership activities (Valizade et al., 2016). It is thus important to further explore 
the linkages between partnership practices and worker outcomes, and in particular the 
unresolved issue of whether organisations and employees both stand to gain from 
partnership-style arrangements.  
In order to explore the outcomes of workplace partnership for employers and 
employees, we use a large matched employer-employee dataset (the Workplace Employment 
Relations Study, WERS2011). Our analysis focuses on large private sector firms (250 or 
more employees), and explores partnership practices and the relationship with selected 
worker outcomes and firm performance. We contribute to the existing literature in several 
ways. First, situated within social exchange theory, our analysis investigates the mutuality of 
5 
 
partnership outcomes and includes an assessment of both employee and firm outcomes. 
Second, the survey-based quantitative research method enables us to make some broader 
generalisations about the outcomes of partnership by assessing the effectiveness of various 
forms of workplace partnership mechanisms (i.e. direct vs indirect employee participation) 
associated with the delivery of mutual gains. Third, instead of categorising partnership 
outcomes as fitting neatly into one of the three main theoretical perspectives outlined above, 
we suggest that the gains from partnership may align with more than one of these theoretical 
frameworks. Much depends upon the utilization of specific forms of partnership practices in 
workplaces. Specifically, rather than merely addressing the perennial question of “who wins 
or loses from workplace partnership” our empirical analysis allows us to explore the types of 
partnership practices more likely to deliver positive or negative effects on employee and firm 
outcomes, as well as those with no significant effect.  
 The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section provides a brief 
overview of the partnership debate, followed by a definition of partnership, as well as the 
main theoretical perspectives evident in the literature. We then derive the hypotheses to be 
tested. We continue by outlining the dataset used, and explaining how we constructed our 
measures. This is followed by the empirical analysis and results of our study. We then 
provide implications for theory and practice, and propose directions for future research.  
 
 
2. Background 
2.1 The partnership debate 
Partnership has been one of the most high-profile debates in industrial relations in recent 
years (Bacon and Storey, 2000; Brown, 2000; Johnstone and Wilkinson, 2016). In Britain, 
interest in partnership surged in the 1990s, and the concept was embraced by the Blair 
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government as a way of ‘modernising’ employment relations as part of the Fairness at Work 
agenda (Johnstone, 2016). Enthusiasm for partnership was also evident from a range of 
policy bodies including Acas, the Involvement and Participation Association and the TUC 
(Acas, 1999; IPA, 1998; TUC, 1998). Though a commonly accepted definition remained 
elusive, for most trade unions and industrial relations commentators partnership was 
primarily concerned with improving relations between trade unions and employers.  However 
for others, and especially those representing business interests, partnership was interpreted 
much more broadly as a particularly cooperative style of employment relations which is 
possible both with and without unions (see for example CIPD, 1998).    
Many public and private sector employers engaged with the partnership agenda, 
especially in unionised organisations where partnership was often viewed as a way of 
recasting existing union management relations (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004). By 2003 the 
IPA listed 50 organisations which met their definition of partnership in both union and non-
union contexts (IPA, 2003), while an academic review of formal union management 
agreements by Bacon and Samuel (2009) suggested at least 248 such agreements had been 
signed. 
 
2.2 Definitions of partnership 
A key challenge has been the lack of a commonly agreed definition (Martinez Lucio and 
Stuart, 2004; Guest and Peccei, 2001). Some employer bodies were only willing to commit to 
a fairly loose Unitarist interpretation, which promotes labour management cooperation but 
assumes common interests and is wary of trade unions. Most partnership researchers, 
however, subscribed to a pluralist interpretation and viewed effective employee 
representation, usually involving trade unions, as a cornerstone of meaningful labour 
management partnerships (Bacon and Samuel, 2009).  Acknowledging the existence of non-
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union employee representation, others noted the possibility of developing partnership-style 
relations in non-union settings, and suggested that such the nature of such arrangements 
should also be investigated empirically (Ackers et.al, 2005; Johnstone et al, 2010a; Shah et 
al., 2016). Yet there remains a lack of agreement regarding how we identify instances of 
partnership or non-partnership. Is an organisation a prima facie ‘partnership organisation’ 
because they espouse partnership working with employees and their representatives? Does 
partnership require a formal partnership agreement or are de facto partnership relationships 
feasible? To what extent is partnership defined in terms of specific HR practices (such as 
employee voice) or simply shorthand for certain ER processes and outcomes (such as high 
levels of workplace cooperation)?  
Based upon a review of a decade of British partnership research, Johnstone et.al 
(2009) suggested that a more useful definition of partnership would identify both the HR 
practices and employment relations processes associated with partnership.  In terms of 
practices, employee voice is central to all definitions, and this may involve a mix of direct 
participation, representative participation and financial involvement.  Besides (representative) 
employee voice, complementary HR practices include mechanisms to support 
communication, flexibility and job security. Many of these HR practices are similar to those 
normally identified as part of a ‘high performance work system’ or ‘high commitment’ 
approach to HRM (Roche, 2009; Appelbaum et al., 2000).   
In terms of employment relations processes, decision-making and the nature of actor 
relationships are also believed to be important. Decision-making processes are expected to be 
highly participative with extensive dialogue and consultation between management, 
employees and their representatives at an early stage. Actor relationships thus require high 
levels of trust, openness and transparency, as well as commitments to joint problem-solving 
and business success (Bacon and Storey, 2000; Johnstone et al, 2009; Johnstone, 2014).   
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 In the present study, we operationalise workplace partnership to include indirect 
employee participation through trade union representation as well as direct employee 
participation mechanisms. In particular, our conceptualisation of partnership practices using 
the WERS dataset is heavily influenced by the work of Guest and Peccei (2001) and Guest et 
al (2008). Borrowing from the operational checklist of eight implicit and explicit partnership-
type activities, Guest et al. (2008) provide five conceptual categories of partnership practices 
detected in WERS 2004, including 1) direct employee participation, including task-based 
decisions and direct contribution through quality improvement teams and attitude surveys; 2) 
representative participation in a range of issues (e.g. pay, holidays); 3) performance 
management, including performance appraisal and incentive payment systems; 4) employee 
share ownership programmes; and 5) downward communication, including information 
sharing, harmonisation and employment security. In total, 18 partnership practices1 were 
identified. Though the set of practices may look like a combination of employee participation 
and high commitment work practices, they may represent the process of mutuality (Storey et 
al., 2008).  Given that the partnership label has always been vague and controversial there are 
of course questions regarding the extent to which the term remains analytically relevant or 
useful (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2004).  However the term remains influential and widely 
used in discussions of labour management cooperation both in both policy and practice 
circles.  Furthermore, WERS11 includes a discussion of ‘partnership’ for the first time in the 
series (van Wanrooy et al, 2013). 
  
 
                                                            
1 They are 1) task-based participation, 2) involvement in changes, 3) job flexibility, 4) quality improvement 
programmes, 5) face-to-face meeting, 6) attitude surveys, 7) other forms of communication, 8) content of 
communication, 9) consultative committee, 10-11) content of negotiation/consultation with union (non-union) 
representatives at workplace, 12) performance appraisal, 13) PBR/merit pay, 14) employee share ownership 
programmes; 15) profit-related pay, 16) fringe benefits, 17) single status, and 18) job security (Storey et al., 
2008: 138-139).  
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2.3 Workplace partnership and social exchange theory  
In conceptualising partnership, social exchange theory is one of the most influential 
conceptual paradigms that has been adopted in understanding the employment relationship 
(Coyle-Shapiro and Conway, 2005). The best known exchange rule is probably reciprocity, 
where party one, upon receiving a favour or reward from party two receives an obligation to 
reciprocate and vice versa. Molm (2000; 2003) argues that a ‘reciprocal exchange’ does not 
include explicit bargaining, rather it relies on interdependence between exchanging parties 
(one party’s actions are contingent on the other’s behaviour) that reduces risk and encourages 
cooperation (Molm, 1994). On the other hand, parties of exchange may also negotiate rules in 
the hope of reaching a beneficial arrangement (Cook and Emerson, 1978; Cook et al., 1983). 
Such agreements tend to be more explicit than those built upon the norm of reciprocity, and 
the duties and obligations exchanged are detailed and understood (Cropanzano and Mitchell, 
2005). Negotiated exchanges are essentially economic transactions where individuals 
consider how to minimise costs and maximise rewards through a subjective cost/benefit 
analysis (Kinge, 2014). The general rule is that relationships will be established and 
maintained if the balance between costs and rewards can be achieved. Such balancing is 
referred to as reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960), and is formed and strengthened by creating 
obligations and feelings of indebtedness from one party towards another exchange for their 
past positive (or beneficial) behaviour. As each party regularly reciprocates and discharges 
their obligations they prove themselves trustworthy. This in turn strengthens the exchange 
relationship.  
Kinge (2014) argues that the social exchange theory provides a useful theoretical lens 
to capture the conditions that foster reciprocity, and explain how relations between actors 
contribute to a sustainable partnership or result in its collapse. Partnership relationships are 
conceptualised as social interactions, and a process of negotiated exchanges of both material 
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and non-material goods between employees and their employers through either direct 
(Oxenbridge and Brown, 2002) or indirect (Upchurch et al., 2006) arrangements.  Belanger 
and Edwards (2007) view partnership practices as a set of collaborative initiatives that aim to 
foster reconciliation of both employer and employee interests using mechanisms of social 
dialogues and consultative systems. Partnership mechanisms can thus be interpreted as a 
communication system and viewed as having a symbolic or signalling function to employees. 
The development and implementation of a wide range of partnership practices is valuable in 
strengthening the message and making it salient. Employees interpret partnership-type 
activities as indicative of organisational support and duty of care, and accordingly they 
reciprocate with positive employee attitudinal and behavioural outcomes, including 
organisational commitment and job satisfaction (Valizade et al., 2016; Whitener, 2001). The 
benefits and costs of partnership arrangements can be considered as having an extrinsic or 
pecuniary nature versus an intrinsic or non-pecuniary nature (Cooke, 1990). In assessing the 
types of worker gains (or losses), Glover et al. (2014) suggest that these may encompass both 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ gains. Roche (2009) proposes that employees are more likely to benefit from 
partnerships that embrace intrinsic characteristics, such as a more pleasant working 
environment, improved communication, a better quality of work life and better working 
relations between management and employees. In particular, partnership arrangements reflect 
a more cooperative and consultative approach to labour management, emphasising the 
benefits of employee voice in decision-making process in terms of employee commitment 
and positive work attitudes and behaviours.  
However, the norm of reciprocity also has a negative side. Employees may believe 
management cannot be relied upon (e.g. hostilities, insincerity), and therefore feel more 
exposed and vulnerable, jeopardising positive attitudes towards the organisation (Tzafrir, 
2005). This is consistent with the ‘behavioural perspective’; in other words partnership is 
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adopted by employers primarily to control employee behaviour and improve organisational 
performance (e.g. Van De Voorde et al., 2012). Partnership can thus be viewed primarily as a 
means of reasserting managerial control over employees (Whyman and Petrescu, 2014). 
While such an approach might deliver benefits for organisations it is unlikely that a highly 
lop-sided arrangement will benefit workers or their representatives, and where an acceptable 
balance of costs and rewards is not attained partnership might collapse.  
 The ‘pessimistic thesis’ suggests that workers and trade unions do not stand to gain 
much, if anything, from workplace partnership (Kelly, 2004; Upchurch et.al, 2008). 
Adherents to this ‘win-lose’ view argue that employers typically determine which partnership 
practices are implemented, and employees are unlikely to derive any significant gains 
(Godard, 2004). Evidence of this perspective is probably most apparent in the partnership 
critiques by radical and labour process scholars in the British literature. In a study of matched 
partnership and non-partnership firms, Kelly (2004) found that while employers appeared to 
benefit from partnership, there were negligible gains for workers or trade unions when 
evaluated against criteria such as wages, hours worked, holidays or job losses.  Indeed in 
terms of wage levels, employment security and influence over decision making the findings 
were negative.   Employee gains were only found to be achieved where unions were strong, 
and where the firm was performing well. It is suggested that in most cases partnerships are 
likely to be lop-sided or ‘employer dominant’. Similar critiques have been offered by 
Upchurch et al (2008) and Danford et al (2014) in studies which doubt the potential benefits 
for employees or trade unions.    
Finally, the ‘constrained mutuality’ thesis also suggests that employees and their 
representatives may well stand to benefit in some ways from partnership, but that typically 
the ‘balance of advantage’ will be tipped in favour of the employer (Guest, 2001). Perhaps 
this is not necessarily a problem so long as all parties do benefit in some way; indeed it is 
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difficult to imagine what a perfectly balanced arrangement would look like. Yet to be 
sustainable partnership cannot be completely lop-sided, as ‘positive organisational outcomes 
of interest to employers depend for their achievement upon the prior achievement of 
outcomes likely to be relevant to employees and their representatives’ (Guest and Peccei, 
2001: 1321). If partnership is perceived to be serving primarily or exclusively the interests of 
employers the potential for these gains will likely be short lived. From this perspective, while 
establishing a workplace partnership may be possible in certain circumstances, it is also likely 
to be difficult to sustain and vulnerable to collapse, especially in lightly regulated liberal 
market economies (Dobbins and Dundon, 2015).  
 
2.4 Mutual gains and hypotheses derivation 
Perhaps the most highly contested debate is the extent to which partnership practices and 
processes will lead to mutually beneficial employment relations outcomes for both firms and 
workers. The mutuality view is essentially reflected in the tenets of social exchange theory: 
the generation of valued organisational outcomes is conditional upon the influence of 
employer behaviour on employee beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. Employee behaviours are 
critical to whether desired organisational outcomes will be attained, and shaped by employee 
perceptions of and their cognitive and affective responses to various partnership activities 
(Boxall and Macky, 2007). Our first analysis of partnership outcomes at an individual level 
investigates the relationship between workplace partnership practices and the level of 
employee job satisfaction, and the level of organizational commitment (Glover et al., 2014; 
Roche, 2009; Valizade et al., 2016). The second analysis at an employer level examines the 
relationship between partnership practices and two indicators of organizational performance: 
labour productivity and financial performance.  
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The mutual gains view or ‘optimistic perspective’ (Cooke, 1990), builds on a rational 
choice approach whereby partnership provides an efficient mechanism to increase the total 
‘pie’ available to be shared between employers and their employees rather than an adversarial 
model (Geary and Trif, 2011). For gains to be accrued to all parties, the partnership principles 
and practices need to be established simultaneously at multiple levels within the organisation, 
i.e. at ‘strategic level’, ‘functional human resource policy level’ and workplace level (Kochan 
and Osterman, 1994). In addition are participative structures and processes that emphasise the 
intrinsic motivation/values/rewards through which employees make contributions that 
directly relate to work tasks and work organisations (e.g. direct task-based participation, 
‘briefing groups’ or two-way communication) (White et al, 2004), and channels for employee 
voice. To this end, participatory practices both in tandem and in alignment (Geary and Trif, 
2011) highlight employees’ awareness of their ‘voice’ or ‘say’ in workplace decisions 
(Glover et al, 2014; Timming, 2015) and will foster higher levels of job satisfaction and 
organisational commitment. Using a national employee dataset, McGovern et al (2007) 
suggest that the main influence on whether employees see themselves as having a say in 
changes in relation to their jobs are participation in two-way communication or in quality 
circles. Moreover, adequate representation and assurance of employees’ interests through 
dialogue with management enhance employees’ sense of organisational belonging 
(Wilkinson et al, 2014), which is central to organisational commitment. Similarly, where 
workplace partnership is perceived as a way of improving the quality of working life, we can 
expect a positive association with job satisfaction. Appelbaum et al. (2000) study of 
employment practices in 44 US manufacturers suggests that participatory work practices, 
including worker autonomy, degree of communication among frontline staff, work in self-
directed teams and participation in problem solving teams, can generate a variety of ‘win-
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win’ outcomes for both plants and workers, including job satisfaction and organisational 
commitment. Hence, we hypothesise that: 
 
H1: Job satisfaction is higher in organisations with partnership characteristics than 
those without partnership characteristics. 
H2: Organisational commitment is higher in organisations with partnership 
characteristics than those without partnership characteristics. 
 
Social exchange theory suggests that the benefits accrued to employees in terms of 
increased job satisfaction and organisational commitment derived from workplace 
partnership will eventually also be reflected in improved firm performance. Evidence has 
shown that employee job satisfaction and organisational commitment are positively 
associated with organisational performance, including labour productivity and financial 
performance (Gould-Williams, 2003; Meyer et al, 2002). Committed and satisfied employees 
not only identify psychologically with their employers and become strongly attached to the 
organisation, but also tend to expend discretionary effort towards achieving organisational 
ends (Appelbaum et al, 2000). Moreover, a satisfied and committed workforce is less likely 
to exhibit counter-productive behaviours, engaging in greater amount of positive extra-role 
behaviours and better quality in-role behaviour. For example, Knell’s (1999) study of 15 
British firms found that the introduction of partnership arrangement led to increased turnover 
and profits for organisations; and higher level of job satisfaction for employees. Hence, we 
hypothesise that:  
 
H3: Labour productivity is higher in organisations with partnership characteristics 
than those without partnership characteristics. 
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H4: Financial performance is higher in organisations with partnership characteristics 
than those without partnership characteristics. 
 
3. Data and measures 
3.1 Data description 
We use the sixth and latest wave of WERS (WERS2011), which is based on a stratified 
sample of UK establishments with 5 or more employees that operate in Sections C to S of the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 2007) in 2011, accounting for 35% of all workplaces 
and 90% of all employees in the UK. The survey provides useful insights into employment 
relations by collecting a wide range of employment related information from managers, 
employees and their representatives. In particular, it is the first time that a discussion of 
workplace ‘partnership’ appears in the WERS series (van Wanrooy et al., 2013). The 
elements of the survey used in the present study consists of face-to-face interviews with 
senior managers with responsibility for employment relations (cf Management Questionnaire; 
response rate=46%), and self-completion questionnaires distributed to a random sample of up 
to 25 employees in each surveyed establishment (cf Employee Questionnaire; response 
rate=54%). Given the distinctiveness of employment relations in private and public sector 
organisations, as well as the differences between HR practices in large and small firms, we 
focus only upon large private organisations. This is also where most of the debate regarding 
the efficacy of union and non-union partnership has been located. We follow the standard 
European definition of large organisations; only firms that employ 250 or more employees in 
private sector are included. The WERS dataset includes information on the size of the 
workplace, but also identifies whether the workplace is single-site or multi-site enterprise and 
provides information in relation to the total number of employees in the multi-site 
organisations, and allows us to identify large organisations with 250 or more employees.  
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3.2 Partnership practices 
Given that no consensus has emerged on what partnership activities should be included in a 
comprehensive partnership checklist, the operationalisation of partnership practices should be 
readily and independently observable (Dietz, 2004). Following Guest et al.’s (2008) five 
broad conceptual categorisation of workplace partnership based on the WERS2004 dataset, 
we identified fifteen individual partnership practices in WERS2011 consisting of a mix of 
forms of direct and indirect employee participation in workplaces (see Table 1). Specifically, 
three consultation-based practices (i.e. the presence of joint consultative committee or work 
council, consultation through union and worker representatives) represents indirect or union-
based partnership practices. The remaining twelve partnership practices including employee 
participation, communication and information sharing, performance appraisal, contingent pay 
and employment security entail the process of mutuality (Storey et al., 2008) and are viewed 
as direct forms of partnership working. Drawing up social exchange theory, we have 
hypothesised that partnership practices that offer an opportunity to engage and motivate 
employees, and to improve performance foster positive work-related attitudes and boost 
organizational performance, supporting the mutual gains perspective.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3.3 Worker outcomes 
We capture the benefits accruable to employees by exploring two of the mostly wide studied 
forms of employee attitudes: job satisfaction and organisational commitment. In WERS2011, 
employee respondents are asked to what extent they are satisfied with nine aspects of the job 
(see Kersley et al., 2006 for WERS2004). The nine items are ‘satisfaction with sense of 
achievement’, ‘satisfaction with scope of using own initiative’, ‘satisfaction with influence 
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over the job’, ‘satisfaction with training’, ‘satisfaction with opportunity to develop skills’, 
‘satisfaction with amount of pay’, ‘satisfaction with job security’, ‘satisfaction with 
involvement in decision-making’ and ‘satisfaction with the work itself’. The responses are 
evaluated on five-point Likert scale: 1= ‘strongly disagree’, 2= ‘disagree’, 3= ‘neither agree 
nor disagree’, 4= ‘agree’ or 5= ‘strong agree’. Regarding the organisational commitment, 
three statements are drawn from Employee Questionnaire (see Forth et al., 2004): 1) ‘I share 
many of the values of my organisation’; 2) ‘I feel loyal to my organisation’; and 3) ‘I am 
proud to tell who I work for’. The responses are also evaluated on five-point Likert scale: 1= 
‘strongly disagree’, 2= ‘disagree’, 3= ‘neither agree nor disagree’, 4= ‘agree’ or 5= ‘strong 
agree’. To proceed with construct an overall measure for the job satisfaction and 
organisational commitment measures after measuring the Cronbach’s α (0.87 and 0.85, 
respectively). The summary statistics for worker outcomes are shown in Table A1 in 
Appendix.  
 
3.4 Organizational outcomes 
Two indicators of organizational performance are identified in the Management 
Questionnaire, which are financial performance and labour productivity. Specifically, 
managers are asked to provide responses to the following two questions: ‘Compared with 
other establishments in the same industry, how would you assess financial performance?’ and 
‘Compared with other establishment in the same industry, how would you assess labor 
productivity?’ Responses are measured on a five-point Likert scale, and coded as follow: 1= 
‘a lot below average’, 2= ‘below average’, 3= ‘about average’, 4= ‘better than average’ or 
5= ‘a lot better than average’. Here we acknowledge that using managers’ subjective 
perceptions of firm performance is subject to limitations. However, such perceptual measures 
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have been widely adopted, especially in the field of HRM and organizational performance 
(Ferguson and Reio, 2010; Den Hartog and Verburg, 2004)2.   
 
3.5 Controlled variables  
Consistent with prior research based on the WERS dataset, we also control a wide range of 
employee and organizational level characteristics (see Table A2 in Appendix). In particular, 
employee level characteristics controlled include job tenure, job status, gender, age, whether 
the worker has academic qualification, trade union status, supervisory responsibility, weekly 
wage and ethnicity. Organizational level variables, such as industry, union recognition, age, 
degree of market competition, the current state of market, and the experience of recent 
recession are considered in the estimation. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 The association between partnership practices and worker outcomes 
In order to empirically investigate the relationship between partnership practices and 
worker/organizational outcomes in large private sector UK organisations, we perform 
regression estimations controlling a number of employee and organisational level 
characteristics. Table 2 (Panel A) presents the OLS coefficient results related to the factors 
associated with job satisfaction and organisational commitment.3 The results show that a 
number of ‘partnership practices’ are found to be significantly related to both metrics of 
employee attitudes. Specifically, the measures of ‘task-based participation’, ‘direct 
communication between senior managers and the whole workforce’, ‘information sharing 
                                                            
2 Hence, our study follows a similar approach although we acknowledge that future research should also focus 
on comparing subjective and objective performance measures. However, Forth and McNabb (2008) find a 
strong correlation between the subjective and objective measures of firm performance using the WERS2004 
dataset, suggesting that subjective financial performance are appropriate alternatives to objective measures. 
3 We also estimate a probit and ordered probit model, but the results are generally consistent. 
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managers’ between managers and their employees’, ‘the presence of profit-related pay for 
non-managerial employees’ and ‘the existence of standard employment contracts for non-
managerial employees’ are all found to be positively associated with both job satisfaction and 
organisational commitment.  
Importantly, however, we find that the effect of ‘employees’ involvement’ depends on 
the nature of engagement. When employees are simply ‘informed’ about decisions this lowers 
job satisfaction and organisational commitment, whereas when decisions are ‘negotiated’ this 
strengthens organizational commitment. Interestingly, we also find that high levels of ‘job 
flexibility’ are negatively related to organisational commitment.  Overall, given our findings, 
H1 and H2 are partly supported. 
 
4.2 The association between partnership practices and firm performance 
Table 2 (Panel B) shows the ordered coefficient results for partnership related activities 
associated with firm performance.4 The first thing to note is that the majority of partnership 
practices are significantly associated with financial performance but only around half are 
linked to labour productivity. Among these practices, the key partnership practices more 
likely to be associated with higher levels of financial performance and labour productivity are 
‘regular face-to-face communication between senior managers and the whole workforce’, 
‘information sharing between managers and their employees’, ‘the presence of result-based 
pay/merit pay scheme, ‘job security policy for non-managerial employees’, and ‘employees’ 
active involvement in the introduction and implementation of organisational changes for past 
two years’ (i.e. they were ‘negotiated’, or they ‘decide’). Financial performance is more 
likely to be higher if ‘task-based participation’ and ‘non-managerial employee share 
ownership programmes’ are present in the organisation. 
                                                            
4 Given that financial performance and labor productivity are both measured on a five-point likert scale, the 
ordered probit regression is applied to examine the direct relationship between partnership practices and firm 
performance. 
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In contrast, the ‘incidence of direct communication between line managers and the 
whole workforce’ (i.e. team briefing) is negatively related to both indicators of firm 
performance. The result is interesting given the fact that communication with senior 
managers has a positive effect. This might call into question the effectiveness of team 
briefings as a form of employee voice, compared to face to face meetings between the 
workforce and senior management, or other mechanisms which allow for employee 
involvement in organisational change.  Potential explanations include the moderating role of 
line managers and the possibility that employees view such meetings as a shallow or even 
ineffective form of involvement. After all, the existence of an employee involvement 
mechanism such as team briefing can reveal little about how it is utilised in practice 
(Marchington et.al, 1992).  Interestingly, while we also find that ‘involvement of union in 
consultation’ reduces organizational performance, we also find that overall union recognition 
is associated with better organisational performance. One possible explanation is that firms 
engage in union consultations at times of actual or anticipated challenges in respect of 
organisational performance.  We also find that, ‘the presence of managerial-employee 
consultation committee’ as well as ‘profit-sharing pay’ are more likely to be related to lower 
levels of financial performance.  Finally, we reveal that high levels of ‘job flexibility’ reduces 
labour productivity. Our results therefore partly support H3 and H4. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion  
There has been an intense debate regarding ‘who gains what’ from workplace partnership 
(Geary and Trif, 2011; Guest and Peccei, 2001), and three main perspectives are evident in 
the extant literature. While the ‘mutual gains’ proponents contend that both employees and 
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employers may derive benefits from workplace partnership (e.g. Kochan and Osterman, 
1994), the pessimistic perspective claims that employees experience negative outcomes (e.g. 
Danford et al, 2005; 2014), while the constrained mutuality perspective argues that though 
workers stand to benefit potential gains are generally tipped in favour of employers (Guest 
and Peccei, 2001), and as such voluntary labour management partnerships can be difficult to 
sustain and vulnerable to collapse (Dobbins and Dundon, 2015). It is possible to identify 
empirical evidence to support all three positions (Johnstone et al, 2009; Wilkinson et al, 
2014). 
Using a matched employee-employer dataset, the primary purpose of our study was to 
examine whether workplace partnership delivers ‘mutual gains’ in large private sector 
organisations in the UK, an area of the economy where there has been intense discussion 
regarding the risks and benefits of partnership approaches (Johnstone, 2015).  Given 
partnership is concerned with reciprocity and mutuality in the employment relationship, our 
analysis is situated within social exchange theory. Overall, our findings appear to support the 
arguments of Geary and Grif, (2011), that the three perspectives evident in the literature are 
not mutually exclusive, and that the gains from partnership can be consistent with more than 
one of above perspectives. Much also clearly depends upon the particular partnership 
practices adopted.  
First, we reveal some support for the optimistic and mutuality views, especially in the 
incidence of non-union based workplace partnership arrangements that stress direct 
participatory practices and employee voice, including introducing a mixed means of task-
based participation and improved direct two-way and one-way communication between 
managers and employees. This is an important finding given that despite an extensive 
literature, few studies have empirically explored the potential of non-union partnerships to 
deliver mutual gains, perhaps reflecting a continued suspicion of NER in industrial relations 
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(Gollan et al, 2014), as well as some definitions which limit workplace partnership to union-
management agreements (Bacon and Samuel, 2009). We also find that partnership practices 
associated with upward and downward communication, namely ‘regular meeting between 
senior management and the workforce’ and ‘information sharing about internal investment 
plans, financial information and staffing plans between managers and employees’, are 
associated with higher levels of job satisfaction and organisational commitment, as well as 
better labour productivity and financial performance. Again, this reinforces the potential 
value and utility of direct employee participation techniques. Our findings thus correspond 
with Cooke’s (1990) argument that ‘bottom-line gains’ at both macro- and micro-level could 
be achieved if the intrinsic motivation/benefits such as improved communication and better 
relations between senior management and employees were emphasised and exercised through 
two-way communication.  
In addition, two other partnership practices that construct ‘task-based participation’ 
(i.e. ‘variety in employees’ work’, ‘discretion over how employees do their work’, ‘control 
over the pace at which employees work’, and ‘involvement over decisions about how work is 
organised’) and ‘employees’ involvement’ (i.e. ‘Workers are negotiated in terms of 
introducing and implementing any changes in past 2 years’) are found to lend some support 
to the ‘win-win’ perspective. While employee voice is central to most definitions of 
workplace partnership there has been little agreement among policymakers and employers 
regarding what form voice should take. In contrast to Kelly’s (2004) findings suggesting that 
employees only gain from workplace partnership in the presence of a strongly and powerful 
union voice in organisations (i.e. indirect employee participation), our findings reveal the 
potential utility of direct employee involvement practices including task-based participation 
and effective communication (i.e. meetings between employees and managers, and 
information sharing) in creating mutual gains for both employees and employers. This is 
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significant given the low union density in the British private sector, where for the choice for 
some workers may be between non-union voice mechanisms or no voice at all (Johnstone 
et.al, 2010a).   However, we also confirm the limitation of dilute forms of employee ‘voice’ 
which offers employees little opportunity to express opinions or influence organisational 
decisions; indeed given our finding that union recognition is associated with superior firm 
outcomes it seems likely a combination of direct and indirect participation is most useful in 
generating positive outcomes for all stakeholders (Geary and Trif, 2011: 46). Following 
Guest et al. (2008), the pursuit of partnership certainly pays off it includes workers’ direct 
participation and autonomy. By implication, a sustainable workplace partnership that derives 
gains for all stakeholders may rest upon a reciprocal relationship of intrinsic or non-pecuniary 
nature. 
Second, to some extent our findings are in line with a ‘win-lose’ view. For example 
high levels of job flexibility, often included as an ingredient of partnership working, are 
found to be negatively related to organisational commitment.  This might suggest that while 
high job flexibility can be desirable for employers, employees may prefer greater stability at 
work. It might also reflect that while partnership theory recommends a quid pro quo between 
employee flexibility and job security (Kelly, 2004), this trade-off is not being achieved or 
perceived in practice.  Indeed, a ‘job security policy’ designed for non-managerial employees 
means the probability of reporting better financial performance and labour productivity, but 
such practices exert a non-significant effect on employee attitudes. One explanation is that 
job security policies are normally concerned with developing policies for managing 
workforce reductions rather than avoiding reductions or making explicit commitments to 
employment stabilisation policies. The impact of job security policies on employee 
perceptions is also complex, especially given the heterogeneity among individual workers. 
On the one hand they might have the desired effect of reducing employee perceptions of 
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insecurity, while on the other it is possible that employers introduce formal policies where 
concerns about job security are already high. Similarly, partnership practices measuring 
employees’ financial involvement, i.e. ‘non-managerial employees receive results based 
pay/merit pay’ and ‘non-managerial employee receive share ownership schemes’ are more 
likely to be associated with high levels of financial performance and labour productivity. 
However, they are statistically insignificant in relation to both indicators of employee 
outcomes. This pessimistic perception of work attitudes and firm performance as conflicting 
outcomes exist is probably due to a trade-off between employee attitudinal outcomes and 
organisational performance (Van De Voorde et al, 2012). That is improvement or 
enhancement in performance at organisational level is achieved at the expense of negative 
outcomes at individual level. The effects of HRM policies and practices are mediated by 
employees’ perception and reactions, and subsequently shape their attitudinal and behaviour 
responses (Purcell and Kinnie, 2007). If employees perceive significant ‘asymmetry’ 
regarding to the balance of advantage in workplace partnership, negative outcomes may 
emerge in terms of work attitudes (Roche, 2009). This is particularly so in an organisation 
achieving higher financial performance. In such circumstances partnership-type HR practices 
may be viewed by employees as a façade or even a controlling mechanisms and thus increase 
the level of work intensification and job stress (Ramsay et al. 2000), leading to job 
dissatisfaction and reduced employee commitment. This provides some support for the 
arguments advanced by the partnership critics (Kelly, 2004; Upchurch et al, 2008; Danford et 
al, 2014).  
Lastly, we find that some results do not neatly fit into any of the three main 
perspectives on partnership. Two partnership practices, namely ‘profit-related pay’ and ‘the 
presence of a standard employment contract with non-pay terms and conditions’ for non-
managerial staff are associated with high levels of job satisfaction and organisational 
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commitment but have no or even a negative associations with indicators of (financial) firm 
performance. One potential explanation is the multi-dimensional nature of the notion of 
organisational performance: employee attitudes are characterised as an outcome in parallel 
with organisational performance (Paauwe, 2004).  
 
6. Implication and limitations  
The present study provides some avenues for future research. Using a representative 
employer and employee survey, we have conducted a preliminary analysis of any potentially 
direct association between various forms of individual direct (non-union based) and indirect 
(union based) workplace partnership practices and worker/firm performance outcomes. The 
results suggest that workplace partnership practices, especially those that promote robust 
employee voice including non-union based mechanisms and direct participatory partnership 
practices, i.e. task-based participation and improved two-way communication, might enable a 
shift towards a ‘mutual gains enterprise’ potentially benefiting both employees and 
employers.  This is important given that most of the extant research focuses on unionised 
workplaces and arrangements in non-union contexts remain relatively unexplored. 
 Adherents to the ‘constrained mutuality’ perspective suggest that the effects depend 
heavily upon context, including economic climate, union involvement, the initiatives and 
depth of partnership, and union density (Belanger and Edwards, 2007; Roche, 2009). Our 
study, however, focuses upon the analysis of direct associations between workplace 
partnership and employee/organisational level outcomes. However, it is important to apply 
the propositions in different contexts and further test and investigate the association/strength 
of the relationship between employee/employer outcomes and different partnership practices. 
It would also be useful to explore other employee outcomes in addition to those identified 
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here including employee wellbeing and perceptions of job quality. Further explorations of the 
dynamics of ‘non-union partnerships’ offer another interesting avenue for future research. 
 A key implication of the present study is that the role of direct employee participation 
and effective voice mechanisms and task-based participation as a cornerstone of workplace 
partnership should be acknowledged. Perhaps the continued value of the language of 
workplace partnership is, in contrast to more fashionable terms such as engagement, its 
emphasis upon the importance of reciprocity and mutuality in the employment relationship 
and the acknowledgment of different stakeholders with sometimes divergent interests 
(Boxall, 2013; Purcell, 2013). In terms of practices, we highlight the continued significance 
of high performance work practices, particularly those concerned with employee involvement 
practices and voice. Our study confirms that employees can certainly reciprocate with 
positive work attitudes where employers offer a generous amount of autonomy and discretion 
over their work, a sense of stability, shares information, and involves employees in 
organisational decision making. Our evidence thus support the arguments of Kochan and 
Osterman (1994) that to deliver mutual gains, partnership is not concerned with a single HR 
practice or simple solution. Rather, it is the combination and mutually reinforcing effect of 
HR policies and practices which is most likely to deliver mutual gains, and probably explains 
the seemingly contradictory results in the existing literature. Crucially we confirm that in 
contrast to management based on unitarist notions of command and control, pluralist 
arrangements which prioritise effective employee involvement (union and non-union) can 
potentially yield benefits for both employers and employees. In practice, however, HR 
strategies are likely to reflect competitive strategy (Schuler and Jackson, 1987; Sisson and 
Storey, 2000).   Partnership approaches stressing reciprocity, mutual gain and worker voice 
are likely to appeal more to employers competing on the basis of quality or innovation, than 
those prioritising cost-reduction where instead we might expect to find limited employer 
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interest in worker voice or high commitment HRM strategies.  This may also partly explain 
the limited diffusion of voluntary workplace partnerships in Britain, where cost-reducers are 
the most common type of firm (Marchington et.al, 2016).  This is not to say, however, that 
such firms and their employees do not stand to benefit from the potential gains which can 
accrue from labour management partnership, or that all such firms use the same HR practices.  
While contingencies such as competitive strategy may help explain differences, in reality a 
combination of various factors shape HR practice.  
Finally, limitations of the dataset should be borne in mind. The provenance of a 
matched employer-employee survey limits the range of trade union outcomes that could be 
investigated. However, it allows us to simultaneously analyse the effect of partnership on 
employee and employer outcomes, accounting for individual and organisational 
characteristics. A lack of consensus regarding the definition and conceptualisation of 
partnership has resulted in problems in empirical literature, and as Guest et.al (2008) note in 
their study based upon an earlier WERS study, HR-based partnership practices may not ‘look 
like’ partnership.  However, they do reflect the idea of partnership if they are accommodated 
within the concepts of mutuality and employee voice, which are central to all definitions of 
partnership.  
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Table 1: Averages/proportions of partnership practices (weighted1) 
Partnership practices %  Direct (non-union based) vs indirect (union-based) 
employee participation in workplace partnership  
Partnership practice 1: Task-base decision   
   Non-managerial employees have a:   
 
Direct participation, part of high performance work 
practices (HPWPs) 
 
      Variety in their work* 2.28 
1.75 
1.25 
1.80 
      Discretion over how they do their work*  
      Control over the pace at which they work*                       
      Involvement over decisions about how work is organised* 
      Overall mean score* 1.77  
Partnership practice 2: Involvement   
   Worker involvement in introducing and implementing any changes   
   in past 2 years b 
  
 
Direct participation, part of HPWPs 
 
      They decided 4.6 
      They negotiated 4.4 
      They were consulted  41.8 
      They were informed 35.0 
      No involvement 14.1 
Partnership practice 3: Job flexibility   
   The majority (60% or more) of non-managerial employees actually 
   do jobs other than their own at least once a week c 
16.7 Direct participation, part of HPWPs 
Partnership practice 4-5: Face-to-face meeting    
   Partnership practice 4: Meetings between line management and the whole workforce d 93.3 Direct participation, part of HPWPs; central to the 
conception of partnership    Partnership practice 5: Meetings between senior managers and the workers d 83.3 
Partnership practice 6: Content of communication   
   Managers give employees information about all three aspects of 
   the firm (i.e. internal investment plans, financial information, and 
   staffing plans) d 
 
35.1 
Direct participation, part of HPWPs; central to the 
conception of partnership  
Partnership practice 7-9: Consultation d   
   Partnership practice 7: Joint consultative committee/work council at workplace d 48.7  
 
Indirect participation, union or worker representatives; 
central to the conception of partnership  
   Partnership practice 8: Management normally negotiate or consult union representatives 
   about seven job aspects of employees (e.g. pay, hours, holidays, etc) d 
12.7 
   Partnership practice 9:  Management normally negotiate or consult non-union 
   representatives about seven job aspects of employees (e.g. pay, hours, 
   holidays, etc) d 
1.7 
Partnership practice 10: Performance appraisal   
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   Non-managerial employees whose performance is formally 
   appraised d 
90.9  
Direct participation, part of HPWPs 
       Among those organisations whose employees’ performance is 
      formally appraised, the majority (60% or more) of non-managerial    
      employees whose performance is formally appraised c 
 
92.5 
Partnership practice 11: PBR/merit pay   
   Non-managerial employees receive either receive results or merit 
   pay d 
60.7  
 
 
Direct participation, part of HPWPs 
 
      Result-based payment alone d 42.9 
      Merit pay alone d 37.1 
      Both results-based and merit payment schemes d 19.3 
      Among those organisations offer either employees results or merit 
      based pay, the Majority of non-managerial employees receive   
      result or merit pay c 
 
78.3 
Partnership practice 12: Employee share ownership programmes   
   Non-managerial workers receive employee share schemes d 37.4  
Direct participation, part of HPWPs 
 
      Among those organisations offer employees share ownership   
      schemes, the majority  (60% or more) of non-managerial 
      employees receive employee share schemes c 
 
91.4 
Partnership practice 13: Profit-related pay   
   Non-managerial workers receive profit-related pay or bonus d 48.9  
Direct participation, part of HPWPs 
 
      Among those organisations offer employees profit-based pay, the 
      majority (60% or more) of non-managerial workers receive profit 
      related pay or bonus c 
 
79.8 
Partnership practice 14: Single status   
   Workplaces that have a standard employment contract with non 
   pay terms and conditions for non-managerial employees d 
92.9 Direct participation, part of HPWPs 
Partnership practice 15: Job security   
   Non-managerial employees are covered by job security policy d 7.0 Direct participation, part of HPWPs 
 Notes:  
1The weighted average is reported, and the unit of analysis is employee (i.e. per observation per employee) 
a The practice is measured on a four-point Likert scale: 0= ‘none’; 1= ‘a little’; 2= ‘some’’ or 3= ‘a lot’. 
b The practice is measured on a five-point Likert scale: 0= ‘no involvement’; 1= ‘They were informed’; 2= ‘They were consulted’; 3= ‘They negotiated’ or 4= ‘They decided’. 
c The practice is measured on a three-point Likert scale: 0= ‘none’, or 1= ‘60% or more’. 
d The practice is measured on a binary scale: 0= ‘no’ or 1= ‘yes’. 
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Table 2: Estimation results of the relationship between partnership practices and employee/employer outcomes 
  Panel Aa Panel B 
Partnership practices Job satisfaction 
Organisational 
commitment  
Financial 
performance 
Labour 
productivity  
Estimation models OLS estimates Ordered probit estimates 
 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Task-based participation 0.044** 0.062*** 0.184*** -0.027 
 
0.018 0.021 0.030 0.031 
Involvement (base cat= no involvement) 
   
     Employees were informed  -0.053* -0.056* -0.010 -0.083* 
 
0.029 0.033 0.048 0.050 
    Employees were consulted 0.010 0.020 0.16.1*** -0.045 
 
0.028 0.032 0.047 0.049 
    Employees were negotiated 0.003 0.126** 0.597*** 0.144* 
 
0.051 0.057 0.085 0.084 
    Employees decide 0.019 0.007 0.484*** 0.234*** 
 
0.052 0.058 0.083 0.084 
Job flexibility (base cat= less than 60%) -0.032 -0.058** 0.032 -0.186*** 
 
0.026 0.029 0.041 0.043 
Face to face meeting with line managers (base cat=no) -0.039 -0.011 -0.190*** -0.126** 
 
0.039 0.043 0.061 0.063 
Face to face meeting with senior managers (base cat=no) 0.073** 0.07** 0.176*** 0.230*** 
 
0.026 0.029 0.042 0.042 
Content of communication (base cat=no) 0.056*** 0.072*** 0.097*** 0.106*** 
 
0.019 0.021 0.031 0.032 
Consultation committee (base cat=no) 0.009 -0.003 -0.155*** -0.048 
 
0.019 0.022 0.031 0.032 
Union consultation (base cat=Not all aspects were covered) -0.019 0.032 -0.087* -0.085* 
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0.027 0.031 0.045 0.046 
Non-union consultation (base cat=Not all aspects were covered) 0.062 0.008 -0.193 -0.223** 
 
0.065 0.073 0.105 0.110 
Performance appraisal (base cat=no) 0.044 0.048 -0.062 -0.078 
 
0.032 0.036 0.051 0.051 
PBR/merit pay (base cat=no) 0.007 0.024 0.322*** 0.277*** 
 
0.020 0.022 0.032 0.033 
Employee share ownership programmes (base cat=no) -0.016 0.0004 0.109*** -0.043 
 
0.022 0.025 0.035 0.036 
Profit sharing scheme (base cat=none) 0.044** 0.058*** -0.113*** 0.001 
 
0.020 0.023 0.032 0.033 
Single status (base cat=no) 0.095** 0.102** 0.089 0.076 
 
0.039 0.044 0.063 0.065 
Job security (base cat=no) -0.031 -0.063 0.201*** 0.305*** 
 
0.034 0.038 0.055 0.057 
Union recognition (base cat=no) -0.002 -0.028 0.304*** 0.166*** 
 0.023 0.026 0.037 0.038 
     
Controls yes yes yes yes 
Log likelihood - - -6,990.93 -6,185.73 
Chi2 (degrees of freedom) - - 1,101.55[64] 894.70[64] 
Adj. R2  0.08 0.08 - - 
Observations b 6,114 6,258 578 571 
Notes:  
a We also implemented a random effect OLS estimator to control for intra-firm correlation, given that multiple employees respondents may be nested in the same organizations. 
Estimation coefficients results are largely unchanged, and results are available upon request. 
b Observations reported for Panel A are the numbers of employees, and for Panel B are number of organizations.  
Values reported below the coefficients are standard error. 
*p<0.01; **p<0.05; ***p<0.10. 
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Table A1: Descriptive summary of worker outcomes (weighted proportion/means) 
Worker outcomes 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree Agree 
Strongly 
agree 
Job satisfaction % % % % % 
   Satisfaction with sense of 
achievement 2.63 7.12 18.89 52.25 19.1 
   Satisfaction with scope of using own 
initiatives 2.59 7.16 16.82 51.35 22.08 
   Satisfaction with influence over the 
job 2.84 10.19 27.11 45.4 14.4 
   Satisfaction with training  5.74 15.2 24.12 41.36 13.57 
   Satisfaction with opportunity to 
develop skills 5.92 15.01 27.38 38.3 13.38 
   Satisfaction with amount of pay 10.99 23.87 23.77 34.97 6.4 
   Satisfaction with job security 5.07 10.88 23.08 48.62 12.34 
   Satisfaction with the work itself 2.34 6.49 18.32 54.97 17.87 
   Satisfaction with involvement in 
decision-making 5.47 15.68 37.06 34.15 7.64 
Overall job satisfaction1 
3.51 
(0.019) 
Organizational commitment % % % % % 
   I share many of the values of my 
organizations. 1.68 6.86 27.54 49.59 14.33 
   I feel loyal to my organisation. 2.55 6.24 17.83 50.08 23.3 
   I am proud to tell people who I work 
for. 3.36 6.12 23.41 41.89 25.23 
Organizational commitment1 
3.78  
(0.022) 
Notes:  
Weighted proportions/means are reported, and unit of analysis is the employee. 
1Continuous variables. Weighted means and standard errors (in brackets) are reported.  
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Table A2: Statistics summary of demographic characteristics (weighted) 
Controlled variables % 
Employee characteristics 
 
Union Membership 24.5 
Job tenure  
 
    less than 1yr 14.1 
    1 to less than 2yrs 11.5 
    2 to less than 5yrs 24.5 
    5 to less than 10yrs 23.1 
    10yrs or more 26.8 
Permanent 93.3 
Female 54.8 
Age  
 
    16-21yrs 5.0 
    22-29yrs 18.9 
    30-39yrs 23.1 
    40-49yrs 24.6 
    50-59yrs 21.2 
    60-65+yrs 7.2 
Academic qualification 94.1 
Supervisor responsibilities  31.9 
Wage  
 
    £60-100 per wk 5.8 
    £101-220 per wk 13.8 
    £221-310 per wk 14.5 
    £311-430 per wk 19.6 
    £431-520 per wk 10.0 
    £521-650 per wk 11.1 
    £651-820 per wk 10.0 
    £821-1,050 per wk 6.9 
    £1,050+ per wk 8.2 
Ethnicity (British) 82.4 
  
Organisation characteristics 
 
Industry  
 
    Manufacturing 16.1 
    Utility 1.3 
    Construction 1.9 
    Wholesale and retail 21.1 
    Transportation and storage 7.8 
    Accommodation and food service 4.7 
    Information and communication 4.4 
    Financial and real estate activities 13.2 
    Professional, scientific and technical 10.0 
    Admin and support service 4.1 
    Health and Education 12.7 
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    Arts, entertainment and recreation 1.4 
    Other service industry  1.2 
Recognised trade union or work association 54.1 
Degree of competition  
 
    high 82.1 
    neutral 10.7 
    low 7.1 
Current state of market  
 
    turbulent 35.5 
    declining 13.1 
    mature 16.9 
    growing 34.5 
Organisation is adversely affected by the recession  
 
    No adverse effect 8.9 
    just a little 17.5 
    a moderate amount 35.8 
    quite a lot 23.9 
    a great deal 13.8 
Age (ln)* 3.042 
Notes:  
*Continuous variable, weighted mean is reported.  
 
 
 
 
